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Abstract
Pension fund contribution rate volatility has challenged state and local government defined benefit plan
sponsors over time. Methods to contain volatility have been used for years but recent experience has
placed greater urgency on the search for better solutions. This chapter examines the historical approach
to bring stability to employer rates as well as some of the current thinking on the issues. Because both
asset and liability changes can affect volatility, governments are looking at both sides of the balance
sheet for relief.
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Chapter 5
Public Pensions and State and Local
Budgets: Can Contribution Rate Cyclicality
Be Better Managed?
Parry Young

The payment of annual pension contributions is an ongoing concern for
government sponsors of pension plans worldwide (Brainard 2008). During
every budget cycle, the financial officers of US state and local governments
must deal with this issue, as most are sponsors of defined benefit (DB)
plans. Unlike more stable, slow-growing costs such as building maintenance
or even payroll, employer pension contributions are unpredictable even
over the medium term. In an industry like government, which tends to be
service-oriented and thus quite labor intensive (almost three-quarters of
school district expenses, e.g., may be related to people), benefit costs are a
major cost factor.
To make matters even more interesting from a planning perspective,
employer pension costs may be volatile in either direction, up or down. The
actuarial methods used to determine rates generally aim for rate stability,
but they have been unable to contain volatility in recent times due to a
confluence of factors. This chapter reviews some of the major strategies
used by employers to try to tame such rate fluctuations. Next we look at
historical practices and also actions and adjustments made in response
to recent pressures. New approaches may provide ideas for employers
currently grappling with this issue.

Pension contributions
DB pension plans receive revenues from two principal sources: contributions and investment income earned on those contributions. The contributions come from employees, generally at a fixed rate, and employers, at a
rate reset annually. In some cases the employer may pick up the employees’ share. The employer contribution rate reflects the Annual Required
Contribution (ARC) calculated by the system’s actuary. It includes the cost
allocated to the current fiscal year plus an amount to amortize unfunded
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actuarial accrued liabilities. In most years the majority of employers contribute 100 percent of the ARC but some employers may pay only 60 or
70 percent (or 0%) of the ARC. A contribution of less than 100 percent
of the ARC may reflect a weakness in the employer’s current financial
position, or specific funding policies or restrictions. In rare instances, a
payment may be more than 100 percent of the ARC. Reasons for this ‘overpayment’ would include a catch-up for underpayments in prior years, for
example.
Not paying the full required amount in any one year or over a period of
time tends to add to contribution volatility, in that these shortfalls will most
likely have to be made up with correspondingly higher payments at some
future point. Barrett and Greene (2007) reported that only 50 percent
of the state pension funds received the full ARC from their sponsors in
2006. Pension funding statutes, procedures, and policies vary greatly from
state to state and even between local systems within a state. For example,
in California, the code mandates that the full pension contribution be
paid annually by certain counties, including Los Angeles, San Diego, and
Sacramento counties. If the county board of supervisors fails to make the
appropriation to the retirement system, the county auditor is required to
take any available monies from county funds and deposit them with the
retirement system (California Government Code Section 31581).
The Recent Record of Contribution Volatility. The experience of US
public pension funds over the past decade presents ample evidence of
employer contribution rate volatility. Data for state and local government
employers shows pension contribution rates declining from a high of 10.5
percent of payroll in fiscal 1997 to a low of 6.8 percent in fiscal 2002, before
rising again (see Figure 5-1 and Table 5-1). The compilation covers the 12
fiscal years from 1995 to 2006 (NASRA 2008). For the five fiscal years ended
in 2002, rates declined in each year by a mean of 8.3 percent. Even though
the average rate never fell below 6.8 percent of payroll, many fund sponsors
actually experienced contribution ‘holidays’ (no employer contribution)
during this period. This declining rate trend reflected the strong improvement in funded ratios (the actuarial value of assets divided by the actuarial
accrued liabilities) during the 1990s. Driving this improvement were an
increased emphasis on equity investments by public funds and very strong
investment returns for these public plan assets. Public funds increased their
allocation to domestic equities to 45 percent in 2000 from 39 percent in
1992, and international equities to 16 percent from 4 percent during the
same period (PPCC 1993, 2001). The average annual increase for the S&P
500 index of domestic equities for fiscal years 1995–2000 was an extremely
robust 22.2 percent, more than double historical averages.
While the idea of a pension contribution holiday may sound attractive to
an employer, especially if it is experiencing fiscal stress from other quarters,
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Figure 5-1 Employer contributions as percent of state and local government payroll. Source: NASRA (2008).

such a reprieve actually has at least one negative side effect. This danger
is that the sponsor falls out of the (good) habit of appropriating for and
making pension contributions. When the contribution holiday is over and
the time to make contributions comes again, which is inevitable, it seems as
if the current pension cost is now a new expense. This new cost will likely
cause the sponsor’s budget to increase at a faster pace than the normalized
one and it tends to be difficult for revenues to keep pace in offsetting the
increase.
Employer contribution rates to public plans continued to decline in 2001
and 2002, in spite of reversals in investment returns because it generally
Table 5-1 Employer contributions as a percent of
state and local government payroll
Fiscal Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Percent of Payroll
10.5
9.3
8.8
8.0
7.3
6.8
7.8
10.1
9.4
9.7

Source: NASRA (2008).

Percent Change
−
−11.4
−5.4
−9.1
−8.8
−6.8
+14.7
+29.5
−6.9
+3.2
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takes at least a year or two for these changes to be reflected in the actuarial
rates. This delay is due to slow reporting and the active methods in place
to moderate such swings. In fiscal 2000, the S&P 500 index rose 5 percent,
and then it fell dramatically in fiscals 2001 (16%) and 2002 (19%). Such
performance contributed to a rapid decline in public plan funding ratios
and, subsequently, to the concomitant increases in employer contribution
rates. The mean employer rate increases for fiscals 2003 and 2004 were
a sizable 14.7 percent and 29.5 percent, respectively (NASRA 2008). For
most governmental units such increases represented painful budget hits,
underscoring the desire for rate stability.
It may be argued that recent contribution rate volatility is the unintended
side effect of the pursuit of higher return-higher risk asset allocation strategies that have evolved over the last two decades. When public pension
portfolios were more conservative and consisted largely of fixed income
instruments, rate volatility was not a major issue. The more recent, equityoriented portfolios have increased asset and rate volatility, but they have
also added tens of billions of dollars of investment income which would
not have been earned under the more conservative strategies. Without that
income, funding shortfalls would have required higher contributions, the
other revenue source. On a net basis, public pension systems are ahead of
the game financially but in exchange they have had to manage wider rate
swings. It is unlikely that a switch to a significantly lower investment return
policy in return for reduced rate volatility would be widely popular. The
resultant loss of income and the negative effect such a change would have
on the calculation of plan liabilities and average contributions would be a
very high price to pay.

Strategies to modulate rate volatility
Large changes in public pension asset values from investment income
variability and their effect on funded ratios must be held responsible for
a large part of contribution rate swings over the last 10 years. Asset changes
are much more volatile today compared to liability increases which have a
history of more predictable growth. Asset peaks and valleys translated into
advances and declines in funding ratios ahead of corresponding changes
to contribution rates. Most US public funds use some kind of an actuarial
smoothing process whereby gains or losses are spread over various periods,
generally three to five years, without which methods the recent rate change
experience would have been even more volatile. However, existing controls
proved to be largely inadequate to the task of reining in contribution rate
increases, in most cases.
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Asset Valuation. In response to significant changes in employer contribution rates, the actuarial staff of the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS), the largest US public pension fund with assets of almost
$250 billion, instituted a study of this issue earlier in the decade (Seeling
2008). The objectives of the asset smoothing study included finding the
best method which, at the same time, would: minimize the negative impact
on the plans’ funded status, minimize volatility in employers’ contributions,
and minimize average future employer contributions. Based on this study,
the CalPERS board adopted a new set of policies to address the problem which reduced employer rate volatility by at least 50 percent. These
new policies included the spreading of asset gains or losses over 15 years
compared to the prior policy of three years. The system also changed the
corridor for the actuarial value of assets to a minimum of 80 percent of
market value and a maximum of 120 percent compared to the previous
corridor of 90 to 110 percent, respectively. Employers who have a funded
status of more than 100 percent would now have to make a minimum
contribution of the plan’s normal cost less a 30-year amortization, whereas
under the earlier policies there was no minimum contribution.
The effect that these recommended changes would have on the
employer rates for one class of CalPERS employees, school employees, can
be seen in Figure 5-2 (see CalPERS 2005). Actual employer rates (round
data points) declined sharply after fiscal 1998 and were at 0 percent for four
straight fiscal years—1999–2002—and then began a rapid rise. Normal cost
(dotted line) increased in fiscal 2002 reflecting the effectiveness of benefit
increases. Giving effect to the recommended smoothing methods (triangular data points)—assuming the recommended changes were implemented
10 years earlier—would yield employer rate changes with the same general
trends but not as sharp. Note that there would be at least some annual
contributions in each year under the proposed new methods.
The 2008 issue paper on smoothing policies by CalPERS’ Chief Actuary
Ron Seeling provided an update on the topic. He stated that ‘. . . about 75
percent of all public agency plans experienced an employer rate change
of less than 1 percent of pay between 2005–2006 and 2006–2007. The
remaining 25 percent of plans included those that improved benefits and
had a planned change in employer rate’ (Seeling 2008: 9).
Liability Increases and Employer Rates. While asset changes have been
the major factor in contribution volatility of late, increasing liabilities cannot be overlooked as another significant component. In 2008, CalPERS
stated that about 80 percent of the decline in its funded status earlier in
the decade was the result of the decline in asset values and 20 percent
from benefit increases. Any increase in liabilities above assumed amounts
(actuarial losses) would put upward pressure on rates. Benefit increases
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Figure 5-2 Estimated impact of recommended method as if implemented 10
years ago. Note: Actual employer contribution rates versus estimated rates under
recommended rate stabilization method: schools. Source: GALPERS (2005).

have historically been a factor driving this disparity, but certain uncontrollable factors have also been pushing up liabilities in recent years. These
factors include plan experience which differs from the expected, including
demographic changes such as members living longer. Demographic factors
can result in sizable additions to liabilities and may be ongoing (not just
one-time). Furthermore, changes to actuarial assumptions can boost liabilities. Any decrease in the investment return assumption would increase
liabilities, for example, and recent trends have seen public funds lowering
their investment return assumption more than raising it.
Employer contribution rates go up when pension benefits rise (all other
things equal), adding to asset change-related rate pressures. Too often benefits have been enhanced without fully vetting the long-term consequences
of such a move. Part of the problem of benefit increases is that there is
frequently a time period disconnect between the current administration
granting the increase, and the future administrations and taxpayers to
be charged with the fulfillment of these promises. This may be viewed
as the shifting responsibility for benefit enhancements from one group
to another. Further, not having a long-term plan for identifying the new
revenue source to cover the increased costs in later years places this strategy
in the same category as unfunded mandates: requiring funds to be used
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for a specific purpose in the future but with no solid plan to pay for it.
New sources for financing new pension benefits are rarely identified, in
practice.
Another problem is that pension benefit enhancements have often been
made when other alternatives were not then economically feasible. For
example, benefits may be increased when management believes its labor’s
compensation is below where it should be but the budget cannot absorb
salary increases at that time. The thought (or hope) is that, by the time that
higher contribution rates are required, the government’s financial position
will have improved to accommodate these increased costs. Misconceptions
related to pension funding levels have also led to benefit increases and
added to employer rate pressures. This situation can occur when a pension
system has a funded ratio of more than 100 percent and is perceived to
be ‘over-funded’ or to have ‘excess assets,’ two unfortunate terms. In the
late-1990s some public pension plans with funding ratios exceeding 100
percent came under pressure to increase benefits based on the fallacy that
the assets exceeding accrued liabilities were no longer required by the
system and could be allocated to plan members. The investment losses
in 2001 and 2002 brought home the fact that the so-called excess funds
were actually needed to maintain sound funding levels. Increasing benefits
based solely on a point-in-time overfunded position should be strongly
discouraged.
Checks on Benefit/Liability Increases. Granting new benefits without
fully vetting the ramifications is a potential problem that some governments have sought to correct. For example, the state of Georgia has a
constitutional requirement which requires ‘actuarial soundness’ in pension
systems, as follows: ‘It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact legislation to define funding standards which will assure the actuarial soundness of any retirement or pension system supported wholly or partially from
public funds and to control legislative procedures so that no bill or resolution creating or amending any such retirement or pension system shall be
passed by the General Assembly without concurrent provisions for funding
in accordance with the defined funding standards’ (Georgia State Constitution Article III Section X Paragraph V). Georgia state statutes require a
minimum period of one year between the introduction of any retirement
bill which would have a fiscal impact and its effectiveness. This provision
allows for a reasonable amount of time to examine the ramifications of a
proposal, preventing changes from being rushed through a busy session.
Further, an actuarial investigation must be performed to fully highlight the
economics of each proposal. Too often benefits in other jurisdictions are
enhanced without adequate study of the full, long-term effects on costs.
Before a benefit change bill in Georgia can become effective, it must be
concurrently funded.
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Another method used to contain benefit (and rate) increases has been
adopted by San Francisco. This city requires that any proposed benefit
changes must be approved by voters. This feature carries the implicit
understanding that voters, as taxpayers, hold the ultimate responsibility for
paying any increased pension costs in employer rates resulting from benefit
improvements. Therefore, at least some portion of the citizens on the hook
for paying increased contributions must agree to do so. San Francisco’s
historically strong funded ratio may, at least in part, be attributed to this
protective mechanism.
Decreasing Volatility Through Rate Floors. As we have seen, strict implementation of actuarial recommendations can still result in employer rate
volatility. For instance, many employers were pleased in the 1990s when
their annual actuarial valuations reported that their Annual Required Contribution was in fact zero, due largely to the above average investment
return climate. In response, some systems have decided to override the
actuarially determined rate when it produces a low or zero contribution
result, so as to ease potential contribution shock in the future (the experience of fiscals 2003 and 2004). New York State offers an example. In
May 2003, Governor George E. Pataki signed into law a bill requiring the
state and local sponsors to make a minimum contribution of 4.5 percent
of payroll into the state pension system. At the time of the law’s passage,
the State Comptroller estimated that, had the bill been implemented in
1998, an additional $4.8 billion in employer contributions would have been
collected which would have resulted in a reduction in fiscal 2004 rates by
2 percentage points.
Automatic Stability: Fixed Rates. Strategies that mitigate rate volatility
must include those that outright restrict rate changes. An illustration of this
would be establishing a set contribution rate which may not be changed
without legislative action. A by-product of such an approach, however, is
that if rates cannot be raised to offset actuarial losses, then funding status
may suffer. For example, California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalSTRS) Defined Benefit Program has statutory contribution rates for
members (6% of earnings) and employers (8.25%). In addition, the state
as a non-employer contributor makes a payment (3.3% in 2006), resulting
in a total contribution rate of about 17.6 percent. A presentation to the
CalSTRS board in 2006 found that the unfunded actuarial obligation for
the DB program as of 2005, was $20.3 billion and did not amortize over any
time period (CalSTRS 2006). To achieve full funding, the program would
have to attain the equivalent of an increase of 3.753 percent of salaries
over 30 years. Earlier, in December 2005, CalSTRS’ staff had presented
the board with 13 options to address the funding shortfall, including certain changes to benefits, increases in contributions, the sale of pension
obligation bonds, and the extension of the amortization period for the
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unfunded obligation. Clearly, the fixing of the contribution rate does not
assure funding stability.

Conclusion
Contribution rate volatility is a major concern for public sector DB plans.
Rates have increased rapidly in recent years due to a number of factors
including significant investment losses, benefit increases, and demographic
changes, leaving managers with little time to adapt. As traditional smoothing techniques have not held rates in check, planners have explored,
and some have adopted, new strategies to help ease rate swings. These
include the extension of period over which asset gains and losses are spread
(changed from 3 to 15 years in CalPERS’s case) and the implementation
of minimum rates (4.5% of payroll in New York State). Others have controlled liability growth by keeping close checks on benefit changes (Georgia
requires an actuarial valuation to fully vet costs and San Francisco requires
voter approval). No one strategy is a perfect fit for all plans, but financial
officers looking for rate volatility solutions can benefit from the experience
of those that have made changes in the past.
In spite of the efforts to reduce DB plan contribution rate volatility,
some volatility will remain as long as US public pension fund asset allocation strategies continue to emphasize the higher-risk, equity asset classes,
which include greater volatility by definition. It is unclear as to how far
the principal stakeholders in these systems, including members, employers, taxpayers, and the pension funds themselves, will move down the
scale toward a less risky investment profile in exchange for a more stable
rate environment. The costs of reduced rate volatility under this scenario
include lower investment returns and higher average rates.
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